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The effect of taxes
on corporate financing decisions
– evidence from the German interest barrier
Abstract: The literature suggests that when taking tax effects into account, debt ought to be prefer-
able to equity. Thus, with all else being equal, levered firms are expected to show higher firm values.
However, there are no uniform predictions of the size of this tax benefit from interest deductibility
nor on the effect of changes in interest deductibility. We believe that the German corporate tax re-
form in 2008, which introduced an interest barrier, can serve as a promising “quasi-experiment” to
investigate the effects from a reform of interest deductibility. A study of this reform on the basis
of German financial statement data is of general interest because, first, similar interest barriers have
been introduced in several countries and proposed by the OECD to fight BEPS. Second, the major
characteristics of the German tax system can be regarded as representative for most European and
major Asian countries. Third, single entity financial statements for German companies allows us to
capture tax and capital structure details that have not been available in most prior studies. With
significance at the 5% level, we find evidence that the companies that are affected by the interest
barrier reduce their leverage by 4.7 percentage points more than companies that are not affected by
the interest barrier. We are the first to employ a detailed matching approach to the underlying rich
dataset, which enables us to overcome several limitations of previous studies. Our results imply that
capital structure reactions most likely have been underestimated in previous studies.
JEL Classification: F34, H21, H24
Keywords: Financing decisions, German tax reform, interest barrier, leverage, taxation, thin capi-
talization rules
1 Introduction
The cost of debt is at least partially tax-deductible in most countries, which favors debt
over equity capital. This privilege, often referred to as the tax shield of debt, gives higher
benefits to levered firms in comparison to corresponding unlevered or less levered firms
and thus severely impacts the value of companies.1 This bias for debt against equity in most
countries’ tax codes has led to intensive tax reform discussions, e.g., recently in the Brookings
Institution:
“... the effective tax rate on corporate debt is negative 6.4%, as compared to posi-
tive 35% for corporate equity, according to the Congressional Budget Office. This
tax bias for debt has major negative implications for the US economy. ... Congress
could limit the interest deductions of companies ...”
(Pozen, 2015; for prior discussions, e.g., U.S. Ways and Means Committee, 2011,
Pozen, 2013, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 2013)
Although several countries have already reformed their tax codes accordingly by restricting
interest deductibility, e.g., Belgium, Germany and Italy, to avoid undesired profit shifting or
excessive debt financing, it is unclear whether reforms that aim to reduce the tax privilege
of debt really effectively change financing behavior. Tax politicians expect that reducing in-
terest deductibility will make firms react such that tax shield-driven distortions across firms
can be mitigated. However, empirical studies only provide puzzling results on the impact of
taxes and thin capitalization rules on corporate financing decisions. We believe that the Ger-
man corporate tax reform in 2008, which introduced an interest barrier, provides a promising
“quasi-experiment” to investigate the effects that arise from a reduction in interest deductibil-
ity. This setting, which can be regarded as representative for many countries, enables us to
disentangle the effects of interest deductibility restrictions on corporate capital structure
in a unique way. Since this reform, the deductibility of debt expenses has been limited if
a certain exempted amount is exceeded and a set of other conditions is met. Against this
background, it is interesting to determine whether the emerging corporate capital structure
reactions are in line with the rather moderate tax rate and thin capitalization sensitivity of
corporate leverage that were previously found.
In contrast to many prior empirical studies, we find robust evidence for the negative impact
of such thin capitalization rules on corporations’ debt ratio and thus evidence of its general
effectiveness. With significance at the 5% level, we find evidence that the companies that
are affected by the interest barrier reduce their leverage by 4.7 percentage points more than
those that are not affected. Firms with no liquidity constraint even respond with a reduction
of 6.0 percentage points. This result indicates that the impact of thin capitalization rules
on corporate debt financing has been underestimated so far. Our results also indicate that
1 See Kemsley and Nissim (2002).
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the economic size of this reform is rather limited due to the low number of affected firms.
However, we show that those firms that are subject to the interest barrier respond more
sensitively than what has been suggested in prior studies. Hence, if other countries that
currently discuss related rules decide to introduce an interest barrier that is applicable to a
broader group of firms, our results can be regarded as a lower bound of the considerable
expected capital structure reactions.
We use the Dafne database by Bureau van Dijk, which contains data from single entity fi-
nancial statements of German companies. We concentrate our investigation on incorporated
firms, i.e., the legal forms “GmbH” and “AG” because their disclosure requirements are higher
than for partnerships and use information drawn from the profit and loss accounts from
2004 to 2010. We apply a “difference in difference” approach (DiD) and conduct detailed
propensity score matching to form an appropriate control group based on several company-
specific metrics to the underlying rich dataset. Therefore, we are able to overcome some of
the limitations of previous studies.
In the literature, in a series of model-theoretic analyses, Modigliani and Miller (1963) and
Miller (1977) have already demonstrated that taxes have an impact on a company’s debt
ratio. The theoretical literature suggests that when tax effects are taken into account, debt
ought to be preferable to equity.
The trade-off theory offers a theoretical explanation for capital structure decisions and an
optimum debt ratio for individual companies. This theory indicates that the tax benefit of
the deductibility of debt costs at the company level is offset by costs, e.g., insolvency costs,
that increase with an increasing level of debt (Fama and French, 2002). Although there are
no uniform predictions of the size of this tax benefit (tax shield from interest deductibility)
in comparison with an opposing increasing cost of debt (especially insolvency costs), from
a theoretical perspective, there is little doubt that restricting interest deductibility will make
debt financing less favorable. However, Maßbaum and Sureth (2009), who take the Belgian,
Italian and German rules as an example, show why corporations receive both debt and equity
capital. They analytically find that the financing effects of thin capitalization rules are non-
uniform and depend significantly on the underlying tax system.
Surprisingly, in a series of empirical studies, the impact of taxes on the capital structure
could not be clearly demonstrated. For instance, Frank and Goyal (2009) find, based on the
studies of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991), that there are six core
factors that influence capital structure, none of which are taxes. However, they note that due
to the trade-off theory, it is likely that an increasing tax rate and thus tax shield will lead to
an increased debt ratio.
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Further empirical studies examine two relationships: the relationship between the marginal
tax rate (MTR) and the financing structure of companies and the one between interest de-
ductibility and financing structure.
First, MacKie-Mason (1990), Givoly et al. (1992), Graham (1996), Sarkar and Zapatero (2003)
and Stöckl and Winner (2013) focus on tax rate effects and find that a higher MTR is associ-
ated with a higher debt ratio. In addition, Graham (2008) finds that although many studies
demonstrate that taxes influence financing decisions, this effect is not always strong. Buet-
tner et al. (2009) indicate that a higher local tax rate is also associated with an increase in
internal debt. Barclay and Smith (1995), Ayers et al. (2001) and Huang and Ritter (2009) find
evidence for a negative relationship between the MTR and the debt ratio. Antoniou et al.
(2008) cannot identify a clear significant relation between the debt ratio and the effective tax
rate (ETR) in several countries. Faced with a large number of studies with mixed results on
the relationship between tax rates and the debt ratio, Feld et al. (2013) analyze 46 previous
empirical studies in a meta-analysis. They conclude that the debt-to-asset ratio rises by 2.7
percentage points if the simulated marginal tax rate increases by 10 percentage points.
Second, Shih (1996) employs IRS data compiled from corporate tax returns and finds evidence
that limited interest deductibility due to tax exhaustion affects leverage decisions. Buettner
et al. (2012) empirically analyze the effects of thin capitalization rules on the capital structure
of multinational firms’ foreign subsidiaries located in OECD countries between 1996 and
2004. Their results indicate that thin capitalization rules effectively reduce the incentive to
use internal loans for tax planning but lead to higher external debt. Similarly, Blouin et al.
(2014) empirically investigate the impact of thin capitalization rules on the capital structure
of U.S. multinationals foreign affiliates in 54 countries. They show that these restrictions
reduce an affiliate’s debt to assets ratio by 1.9 percentage points on average.
A variety of studies have examined the impact of taxes on the financing decisions of firms
using tax reforms as a “quasi-experiment”. Changes in the tax system, e.g., a change in the
tax rate, are used as an exogenous shock to examine whether companies have responded as
predicted by theory. Empirical studies in a national and international context include the
works of Givoly et al. (1992), Alworth and Arachi (2001), Cheng and Green (2008), Weichen-
rieder and Windischbauer (2008), Overesch and Wamser (2010), Lanzavecchia and Tagliavini
(2011), Tzioumis and Klapper (2012) and Faccio and Xu (2015). They find a significant but
usually weak correlation between taxes and the debt ratio. In addition, Schjelderup (2015)
concludes in his recent review that there is only low tax sensitivity of debts in multinational
firms.
Several explanations are provided for the mixed results in many empirical studies, including
differences in empirical specifications, the underlying data or the fact that the sample is
restricted to a specific industry, legal form, or corporation size. Furthermore, investigations
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by Fama and French (2012) indicate that financing decisions are often long-term decisions,
and companies adapt their structure only very slowly.
Prior studies by Dreßler and Scheuering (2012) and Buslei and Simmler (2012) also aimed to
investigate the extent to which the introduction of the interest barrier affects the financing
decisions of German firms. These studies, however, differ significantly from our study in
the way that they determine the treatment and control groups. When replicating, we find
the results and its level of significance to be very sensitive to their sample selection and
identification strategy. Although Buslei and Simmler (2012) find that, on average, the leverage
of the control group is higher than that of the treatment group, we expect an opposing
relation. We expect that companies are affected by the interest barrier if they have sufficiently
high net interest expenses that exceed the exempted amount. Thus, rather large companies
and companies with high leverage are likely to be affected. A battery of robustness checks
supports the significance of our results.2
Considering the partially conflicting results in the prior literature, including the two studies
on the German interest barrier, it is worthwhile to shed light on these issues using an en-
hanced sample selection and identification strategy. We consider this study of a German tax
reform on the basis of German data to be of general interest because, first, many countries in-
troduced similar interest barriers to combat the massive use of debt as a financing and profit
shifting channel.3 Most countries apply thin capitalization rules that limit the deductibility of
interest expenses if the amount of debt exceeds a specific leverage ratio. Moreover, in several
countries the interest expenses are only deductible up to a certain fraction of the earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The number of countries with
such thin capitalization rules has increased rapidly during recent years.4 Second, the major
characteristics of the German tax system can be regarded as representative of most Euro-
pean and major Asian countries. Also, the interest barrier regulations recently proposed by
the OECD (2015) and the European Commission (2016) to fight base erosion and profit shifting
of multinational groups (BEPS) largely correspond to the German interest barrier. Third, the
availability of single entity financial statements for German companies allows us to capture
tax and capital structure details that have not been available in most prior studies. Fourth, in
contrast to many other countries’ thin capitalization rules, the German interest barrier does
not distinguish between interest expenses of different origin but rather covers all types of in-
2 In contrast to Buslei and Simmler (2012), for example, we believe that it is necessary to also control for
time constant differences between the treatment and control groups. Further information is available upon
request.
3 A systematization of different thin capitalization rules and an overview of the different thin capitalization
rules currently in force in selected countries are provided in Figures 7 and 8 and Table 12 in Appendices C,
D, and E.
4 The number increased particularly for the types 9 and 13 described in Appendix D. See, e.g., Greece, Portugal
and Poland from 2015.
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terest expenses. Therefore, the introduction of the interest barrier can serve as an event that
allows us to draw general conclusions on the effect of restrictions in interest deductibility on
the corporate debt ratio. We are convinced that our study is able to provide robust, unique,
and unambiguous evidence for the capital structure effects from the restrictions of interest
deductibility.
The following study is divided into eight sections. Following the introduction, we explain
the German interest barrier in Section 2 and present our hypotheses in Section 3. In Section
4, we present the underlying model. Subsequently, we describe the sample in Section 5 and
analyze it descriptively. In Section 6, we present and interpret the results of our regression
analysis and present robustness checks in Section 7. We summarize and present the study’s
conclusions in Section 8.
2 The German Interest Barrier
The main motivation behind the German Federal Government’s 2008 tax reform was to in-
crease the attractiveness of Germany as a business location and secure German tax revenue
for the long term. The government had recognized that revenues generated in Germany were
being shifted to lower-tax countries, for example through cross-border lending (Broer , 2009).
To prevent this, or at least make it more difficult, it introduced the interest barrier in its 2008
corporate tax reform.
The interest barrier is regulated by German income tax law in § 4h EStG (Einkommensteuerge-
setz) in connection with § 8a KStG of the German corporate tax law (Körperschaftsteuerge-
setz). The tax-deductible interest expense of companies is limited to the amount of interest
income and additionally up to 30% of EBITDA.5 Unused EBITDA will be carried forward to
the following five fiscal years. If interest expenses cannot be offset against EBITDA and an
EBITDA carryforward, they can be carried forward infinitely. Nevertheless, there are some
exceptions to the interest barrier.
The first exception is the so-called “allowance”. If the interest expense exceeds interest in-
come by no more than e 1 million, the interest barrier does not apply.6 Second, the “stand-
alone clause” implies that the interest barrier does not apply to independent companies that
are not members or are only partially members of a corporate group. Third, the “escape
clause” offers shelter against the interest barrier. If a company is part of a corporate group
and its equity ratio at the end of the previous reporting period is lower by no more than 1%
5 EBITDA equals relevant profits plus interest expense less interest income, depreciation and amortization.
6 The initial version of the interest barrier recognized a threshold of e 1 million. See UntStReformG 2008
dated August 14, 2007 (BGBl I 07, 1912). Since the Citizens’ Relief Act of 2009 and the Growth Acceleration
Act in 2009 the exemption limit was raised to e 3 million.
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than that of its parent company, the interest barrier does not apply.7 Fourth, companies clas-
sified in § 15 No. 3 KStG as a part of a “tax group” (Organschaft) are taxed as one company,
so that the interest barrier rules for debt financing are not administered at the single entity
level. For all companies within a tax group, the interest barrier is only applied on the level of
the parent company (Blaufus and Lorenz, 2009).8
Furthermore, the German legislator reduced the corporate tax rate from 25% to 15% and
introduced a flat rate withholding tax of 25%.9 The latter can be interpreted as a decrease in
taxes on interest income. In our analysis and robustness checks we control for the effects
that may arise from these changes.
3 Hypotheses
Using an enhanced sample selection and identification strategy, we investigate empirically
whether the introduction of an interest barrier has a significant impact on companies’ fi-
nancing decisions. The theory suggests that debt is favored over equity, yet it is unclear to
what extent this tax advantage over the rising cost of debt comes into play (Parrino and Weis-
bach, 1999). We expect that a reduction in interest deductibility decreases the tax shield and
further the optimal leverage.
In the following, we examine whether firms responded in their financing decisions (debt or
equity) due to the change in the tax system by the corporate tax reform of 2008, specifically
by the introduction of the interest barrier. We identify companies that would in theory have
been affected by the interest barrier before the reform. Subsequently, we compare these com-
panies’ actual response to the interest barrier to a group of companies that are not affected.
For this purpose, we investigate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1:
Companies that met the subject-to-interest barrier criteria before the 2008 corporate tax re-
form reduced their debt ratio after the implementation of the reform to a greater extent than
the companies that did not meet these criteria prior to the reform.
7 The Growth Acceleration Act of 2009 increased the tolerated threshold from the original 1% to 2% for fiscal
years ending after December 31, 2009.
8 If all entities in a tax group are part of an affiliated group, the interest barrier is not applied due to the
“stand-alone” clause.
9 A solidarity surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag) of 5.5%, has to be added to both the corporate and withholding
taxes. Moreover, the tax base of the local business tax was broadened in the course of the 2008 tax reform.
This tax base broadening impacts the tax burden of all companies in the same way. As those companies that
are subject to the interest barrier and those that are not affected will experience a corresponding change in
their tax burden from this base broadening, in the following, it is not necessary to account for this part of
the tax reform.
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Furthermore, to separate the effect of liquidity constraints from the effect of the interest
deductibility restriction on the debt ratio of those companies that are subject to the interest
barrier, we investigate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2:
Companies that met the subject-to-interest barrier criteria before the 2008 corporate tax
reform reduced their debt ratio after the implementation of the reform to a greater extent if
they did not face liquidity constraints.
4 Identification strategy
4.1 Empirical approach
The research question is investigated by means of a “difference in difference” (DiD) ap-
proach.10 Under this approach, the sample is divided into a treatment group and a control
group. The examined groups of companies differ only in whether they are subject to the
interest barrier. All companies that are affected by the interest barrier thus belong to the
treatment group (TREAT = 1). The remaining companies are allocated to the control group
(TREAT = 0).
Furthermore, using a dummy variable TIME, the sample is divided into records before and
after the 2008 reform. Here, the variable TIME takes the value zero for data before the
reform and one for data after the reform.
The debt ratio (LEV) of the companies in the sample is defined as the ratio between debt and
total assets, and the equity ratio (EQR) is defined correspondingly as the ratio of equity to
total assets. LEV and EQR do not need to sum up to one, e.g., because of provisions. We aim
to investigate the change in LEV over time, which is defined as follows:
∆LEV = LEVt − LEVt−1. (1)
The following model is applied under the DiD approach with the dependent variables ∆LEV .
∆LEV = β0 + β1 · TIME + β2 · TREAT + β3 · (TREAT · TIME)+ β4 · controls + . (2)
To be able to identify the predicted post-reform reaction, a parallel trend of the depending
variable of the two groups of companies prior the reform is necessary. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to validate this requirement in the underlying “quasi-experiment” for a longer
period of time because the relevant observations are only available in the required quality
10 This type of model is also known as “interaction among dummy variables”. See Wooldridge (2014), p. 195-
202, and Roberts and Whited (2013), p. 520-531.
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from 2004 onwards. To compensate for this weakness in the data, we use the DiD approach
with a time dummy, enabling us to control for this shortcoming. Furthermore, we implement
the propensity score matching to ensure that the treatment and control groups are similar
and thus should not differ regarding the development of ∆LEV prior to the reform. This
approach mitigates possible endogeneity concerns. Although, there is in general no way to
statistically ensure that an endogeneity problem has been solved, our DID approach allows
us to safeguard our study best against this potential problem.11 This is true, as we employ
a propensity score matching and show for a subsample that the required common trend
assumption is basically fulfilled. We conduct internal validity tests, including a falsification
test and robustness checks for different definitions of the control group.
In Appendix A, we depict the expected reactions of the treatment and control groups. For the
period prior to the 2008 corporate tax reform we expect no different responses from the two
groups. The two groups may differ with respect to the absolute LEV (difference between the
LEV of the treatment and the control groups; however, due to our matching approach, the
companies do not differ regarding other factors. We expect that the treatment group has a
higher average absolute LEV than the control group. Companies in the treatment group must
have correspondingly high interest expenses to ensure that the interest barrier applies in the
first place, whereas companies in the control group will not have such high interest expenses.
The exogenous shock, that is, the introduction of the interest barrier, affects only the treat-
ment group. Using the DiD, we examine whether the two groups differ in their response to
the 2008 corporate tax reform in their LEV. Furthermore, theory indicates a more pronounced
reaction in firms without liquidity problems (bankruptcy costs). We expect that companies in
the treatment group reduce their LEV more strongly than those in the control group.
The initial model is extended to include control variables that may also have an impact on
∆LEV and thus on financing decisions. In the following, we provide a detailed explanation of
the choice of control variables.12 The control variables are presented in Table 1 along with
the expected reaction of the coefficients.







Table 1: Control variables with the expected reaction
11 See Roberts and Whited (2013).
12 See, e.g., MacKie-Mason (1990), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1999) and Alworth and Arachi (2001).
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The variable SALES is taken as a proxy for company size and is defined as the logarithm of
annual sales.13 Prior empirical studies suggest that larger firms have better access to debt
capital markets. For this reason, they are likely to have higher leverage than smaller compa-
nies. This is because larger firms are more diversified, many have uniform cash flows, and
the probability that they are in financial difficulty is lower (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Gra-
ham, 1999; Bancel and Mittoo; 2004; Tzioumis and Klapper , 2012). Furthermore, information
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers is lower because information in large companies
is more accessible, so the risk of default can be better assessed. The variable SALES is
defined as:
SALES = ln sales. (3)
Lending banks generally require collateral. Collateral may include intangible assets, buildings
or land. It is to be expected that a higher intensity of investment has a positive influence
on the amount of leverage and collateral (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Tzioumis and Klapper ,
2012). Conversely, the investment intensity can also be observed as an indicator of the level of
depreciation allowances or tax-deductible investment incentives that could negatively impact
taxable future profits. If future taxable income is lower, less debt interest can be offset for
tax purposes. This would limit the advantages of using debt. According to this argument it
is expected that a higher intensity of investment is connected with a lower debt ratio. Which
of the two effects prevails cannot be predicted theoretically. The variable COLLATERAL is
defined as:
COLLATERAL = fixed assets
total assets
. (4)
Illiquid companies often have to go into greater debt to meet their financial obligations. Fur-
thermore, the debt costs for illiquid companies are generally higher than for liquid com-
panies as the insolvency risk is greater (Graham, 2000).14 Liquidity is represented by the
CURRENTRATIO and is defined as:
CURRENTRATIO = current assets
current liabilities
. (5)
We expect the variable CURRENTRATIO to have a positive influence on ∆LEV . Profitable
companies can reinvest their profits and thus are likely not to need further debt (Myers,
1993; Graham, 2000). The variable ROA serves as a proxy for profitability and represents the
13 As in previous studies, in the present study SALES data are also strongly left-skewed. Taking the logarithm
of sales produces an almost normally distributed variable.
14 Myers and Rajan (1998) show that under certain conditions precisely the opposite effect can occur. In these
cases it is more difficult for companies to generate cash and debt. These special cases are not considered in
detail.
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influence of the return on total assets on the financial structure of companies. The variable
ROA is defined as:
ROA = earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
total assets
. (6)
We expect the variable ROA to have a negative influence on ∆LEV . With an increasing prob-
ability of insolvency the cost of debt also increases (Graham, 1999; MacKie-Mason, 1990). To
measure the insolvency risk, we use the revised ZSCORE model of Altman (1968) because
a market value for non-listed companies is not available.15 The ZSCORE approach is used
widely in theory and practice and is defined as follows:
ZSCORE = 0.717 · current assets
total assets
+ 0.847 · retained earnings
total assets
+ 3.107 · EBIT
total assets
+ 0.420 · equity
book value of liabilities




For companies with a small ZSCORE, the insolvency risk is higher, and the lower bound-
ary for a strong probability for bankruptcy is 1.23 (Altman, 2013). We expect the variable
ZSCORE to have a negative impact on ∆LEV .
Under the 2008 corporate tax reform, the corporate tax rate of 25% was reduced to 15% in
addition to the introduction of the interest barrier. To ensure that this does not distort the
investigation, we also control for the nominal tax rate for corporations. The variable NTR is
defined as:
NTR = LBT + CTR. (8)
The nominal tax rate NTR consists of the effective local business tax rate (LBT , effektiver
Gewerbesteuersatz) levied at the municipality level and the effective corporate tax rate (CTR),
which includes the solidarity surcharge. The NTR has decreased over time, which also de-
15 The initial ZSCORE Model of Altman (1968) is based on listed U.S. companies. However, several studies
show that that the prediction ability for German and Austrian companies is also acceptable. Furthermore
Agarwal and Taffler (2007) find that the ZSCORE has a clear predictive ability over a time period of 25
years and dominates more naive prediction approaches. See Agarwal and Taffler (2007), p. 298.
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creased the tax shield of debt. Hence, we expect a positive impact.
To test hypothesis H1 the underlying model for ∆LEV is given by:
∆LEV = β0 + β1 · TIME + β2 · TREAT + β3 · TREAT · TIME + β4 · SALES
+ β5 · COLLATERAL+ β6 · ROA+ β7 · CURRENTRATIO + β8 · ZSCORE
+ β9 ·NTR + .
(9)
The investigation already includes the variable CURRENTRATIO as a measure for liquidity.
To investigate the influence of liquidity in more detail, we include the following dummy
variable based on CURRENTRATIO:
LIQUIDITY = 1 if CURRENTRATIO < 1. (10)
If CURRENTRATIO is smaller than 1, the company cannot cover its current liabilities with
current assets. For this reason, the dummy variable LIQUIDITY can be interpreted as an
indicator for liquidity constraints. Furthermore, to separate the effect of liquidity constraints
on companies that are also affected by the interest barrier, we extend the basic model by a
so-called three way interaction.
To test hypothesis H2 we use the following model:
∆LEV = β0 + β1 · TIME + β2 · TREAT + β3 · TREAT · TIME
+ β4 · LIQUIDITY · TIME + β5 · LIQUIDITY · TREAT
+ β6 · LIQUIDITY · TREAT · TIME + β7 · controls + .
(11)
We expect a positive influence of the interaction term LIQUIDITY ·TREAT ·TIME on ∆LEV
because companies that are simultaneously affected by both liquidity constraints and the
interest barrier are not able to reduce their debt ratio in response to the interest barrier due
to their tight liquidity situation.
4.2 Treatment group
First, we identify the companies that would potentially be affected by the interest barrier had
it already existed in 2006.
This study uses financial statement data, so we can only approximate the required data for
the tax balance sheet (Blaufus and Lorenz, 2009). The dummy variable TREAT is set equal to
1 for companies that meet the following conditions:
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1. Net interest expense is greater than e 1 million.16
net interest expense = interest expense− interest income. (12)
2. Net interest expense is greater than e 1 million and the interest expenses exceed 30%
of EBITDA. EBITDA is approximated as follows:17
EBITDA = profit ± M expected loss provisions
± M accrual provisions− participation income
± M deferred taxes± corporate level tax
+ net interest expenses+ depreciations.
(13)
3. The company belongs to a corporate group (participation rate greater than 50%) or there
is harmful debt financing. Harmful debt financing occurs when the investor’s stake is
greater than 25% and the following applies:
net interest expenses of affiliated companies
net interest expenses of corporate group
> 10%. (14)
4. The equity ratio of the subsidiary is more than 1% lower than the one of the parent
company.18 The equity ratio is defined as the ratio of equity to total assets.19
5. The company is not a subsidiary in a tax group.20
16 We use e 1 million as the limit for the net interest expense because the original act stipulated this amount.
Buslei and Simmler (2012) remove all companies from their sample whose net interest expenses are between
e 0.8 million and e 1.2 million. They justify this step by arguing that this prevents a “misclassification”.
However, this removes valuable companies from the sample. Specifically, these companies have a special
purpose due to the proximity to the allowance. For this reason, we omit this step. Unlike Buslei and Simmler
(2012), p. 12, we do not further limit the sample, for example to a net interest expense of greater than e 2
million because we expect that companies whose net interest expense is far from the e 1 million allowance
will also react.
17 See Blaufus and Lorenz (2009), p. 523. For the variables expected loss provisions, accrual provisions,
deferred taxes, corporate income tax and participation income, we assume that if there are no entries in the
database, variables are zero. This approach is consistent with the work of Blaufus and Lorenz (2009) and
was randomly checked against individual financial statements in the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). This
resulted in no deviations in the sample.
18 We set the limit on the equity ratio comparison to 1% because this value was stipulated in the original act.
19 For the parent company the adjusted equity is defined as: equity − shares in associated companies +
0.5 · special reserves with long shares. The corrected total assets are defined as total assets −
Min[loan to associated companies; liabilities]. If these data are not available we use the unadjusted eq-
uity. Goodwill cannot be considered because of missing data. Moreover, our database (Dafne) only contains
information on German companies. This means that this rule only can be checked for German parent com-
panies and the overall result is therefore probably underestimated.
20 A tax group is assumed when the financial statement reports “profit transfer due to profit or partial profit
transfer agreement” or “loss transfer due to a profit or partial profit transfer agreement” and the profit is
zero. The profit must be zero because a partial profit transfer is not sufficient to form a tax group.
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4.3 Control group
Companies that do not meet the criteria in section 4.2 are assigned to the control group. Con-
sequently, a small treatment group may face a large control group. The groups may differ in
specific company properties and group size. In order to avoid a bias in the results a control
group with the same sample size as the treatment group is identified.21 The control group
can be derived from the total sample by a purely random selection, taking into account the
criterion that they are not subject to the interest barrier.22 The DiD approach requires that
the examined groups of companies be very similar in their characteristics and only differ in
the examined property. Because of this, we determine the control group in a so-called match-
ing procedure (1:1 matching) rather than by random selection. With the 1:1 matching for each
company of the treatment group, one company that is as similar as possible is identified us-
ing the predetermined companies’ matching variables.23 Furthermore, “matched” samples
are significantly more efficient than random samples that are independently obtained by a
random process (McKinlay, 1977; Wacholder et al., 1992; Abadie et al., 2004).
To this end, the so-called propensity score matching is applied, taking into account the near-
est neighbor principle.24 To determine companies that are as similar as possible we use a
fixed caliper of 0.1, which means that the difference in the propensity score of the treatment
and the control companies is less than 10%. If no such company can be found within these
limits, the associated companies in the treatment group are removed from the sample.
The empirical finance literature often considers industry and size of the companies to be con-
founding factors. In this study, therefore, total assets, profit and the number of employees
are included as matching variables for the size of the companies in addition to the indepen-
dent variables of the model. We use the logarithm of total assets (TA) and the logarithm of
the number of employees (NE) because the data for these variables are strongly left-skewed.
Using the logarithm produces almost normally distributed variables. We also include ∆LEV
as the independent variable in the matching process because Heckman et al. (1998) show that
the computation of the propensity score should also include determinants of the outcome
variable (see also Finke, 2014). By using ∆LEV we meet the requirement of the DiD approach
that the treatment and control group may not differ with respect to the ∆LEV prior to the
2008 reform.
21 Wacholder et al. (1992) argues that the results are most reliable in empirical studies when the groups are
almost equal.
22 Cosslett (1981) describes three different basic ways to determine a random comparison group.
23 This procedure should also prevent confounding. Confounding implies that in addition to the independent
variables, other, mostly non- manipulable variables may also have an impact on the dependent variable.
Thanks to matching, the companies are very similar with respect to these non- manipulable variables in the
DiD approach. Thus, confounding is minimized.
24 More information on propensity score matching can be found in, e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heck-
man et al. (1998) or Dehejia and Wahba (2002).
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In the matching process, we do not distinguish between industries because only a very small
number of observations in the respective industries within the caliper limit of 0.1 are avail-
able. Consequently, we would need to cluster industries. In contrast to the impact of industry
on the level of leverage, there is no economic or empirical evidence suggesting that indus-
try matters with respect to the magnitude of changes in leverage. Hence, we abstract from
industry effects. Nevertheless, we consider the industry in a robustness check.
The measured variables TA and PR (profit) must be interpreted as critical in that they may
be distorted by accounting and tax-optimized design measures, such as sale-and-lease-back
deals or sales of receivables. The number of employees can also be distorted because tempo-
rary workers or outsourcing effects are not necessarily taken into account. The advantage of
propensity score matching is that it considers multiple dimensions. This, together with the
inclusion of a caliper, can compensate for the weaknesses of individual factors. The matching
method is more effective than an unspecified matching of individual characteristics (Dehejia
and Wahba, 2002).
The matching is performed using the data of 2006, before the reform, taking into account
the variables TA, PR, NE, SALES, COLLATERAL, CURRENTRATIO, ROA, ZSCORE, NTR
and ∆LEV .
4.4 Time
The dummy variable TIME divides the sample into a group before and a group after the
exogenous shock of the 2008 corporate tax reform. The interest barrier was introduced under
the 2008 corporate tax reform and applies for all companies whose year begins after July
25, 2007 and ends not after January 1, 2008. Transitional periods, particularly for existing
financing structures, are not provided for in the act. In Figure 1 these points in time are blue.
years
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011







Figure 1: Overview over time
The Federal Government submitted the draft bill to the Upper House on July 30, 2007, and it
passed early on August 14, 2007. In Figure 1, these dates are highlighted in red. Prior to this
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the draft bill was discussed and finalized in various committees, so companies were already
able to adjust their financial structures as early as 2007. In order to not distort the outcome
of the investigation and to exclude an anticipatory effect of the interest barrier rules, we use
data from 2006 in the regression; i.e., a period well before the corporate tax reform. For the
post-reform period we use data from 2008 in the regression.
The financial crisis in the banking sector started in 2007. In the underlying research setting
with the DID approach and the propensity score matching, the treatment and control groups
should not be affected systematically differently by this crisis. Furthermore, the ZSCORE
serves as a control for credit risks. Further, large companies are more likely to be affected by
the interest barrier and, e.g., the empirical study by Iyer et al. (2014) indicates that small com-
panies are more affected by the financial crisis than bigger companies with stronger banking
relationships. Therefore, we do not expect the financial crisis to bias our investigation.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
5.1 Sample selection
The data we use to test the hypotheses are taken from the Dafne database by Bureau van Dijk
(BvD).25 This unique dataset is composed of actual and historical single financial statements
of over one million German companies. The variables we use are listed in Appendix B.26
The data we use have significant missing values and obvious false entries, which may lead to
erroneous results in the investigation. For this reason, the extracted data are first checked
for completeness and plausibility. For this purpose, all records are removed from the sample
that have no entries for the variables marked with an asterisk in the table in Appendix B
for the studied period or that contain obvious erroneous data.27 Furthermore, all companies
with a negative equity ratio and negative profit (losses) are deleted. Equity ratios of less than
0% are possible when companies (in the short and medium term) generate losses.28 Banks
and insurance companies and non-profit organizations are also removed from the sample
because they have a particular capital structure. This is to avoid further distortion of the
results. To this end, all companies were removed whose US SIC code begins with 6. Non-profit
25 Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing GmbH, http://www.bvdinfo.com/.
26 The excerpt from the Dafne database only includes companies that between 2009 and 2012 had at least
one entry for interest expense and reported subject to German GAAP.
27 For all variables without * we make assumptions for missing data and explain them and their implications.
28 These companies could bias the results because they are threatened by insolvency or liquidity problems.
Thus, these companies are not considered in the following study. However, in a robustness check we
control for loss-making companies.
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organizations are also deleted; they are identified by the term “non-profit” in the company
name (Blaufus and Lorenz, 2009).
In addition to the records from the Dafne database, local business tax rates (LBT ) are ob-
tained from the Federal German Statistical Office for the relevant years for the companies in
the dataset. The LBT is assigned to the registered address of the companies contained in the
dataset.29 Because the effective corporate tax rate is often below the nominal corporate tax
rate, the number of affected companies may be overestimated in our study.
The final sample includes a total number of 4,994 companies. Table 2 summarizes the sam-
ple selection. Approximately 79,000 companies were eliminated from the original sample
number sample size
data with required variables 6,620
equity ratio ≤ 0 −3 6,617
profit < 0 −1,189 5,428
US SIC = 6*** (e.g. banks) −389 5,039
non-profit companies −45 4,994
Table 2: Development of the sample
(approximately 91%) because of incomplete records and missing data. Of the remaining 6,620
companies, three were deleted because of an equity ratio smaller than or equal to one, 1,189
because of negative profits, 389 because of a US SIC code starting with 6 and a further 45
because of their status as non-profit companies. The final sample size of 4,994 companies is
approximately 6% of the total number of companies with the legal forms GmbH and AG in the
database. Table 3 provides more details about the sample with respect to company size.30
sales overall
(in e1,000 ) count in %
< 9,680 1,139 22.80
9,681 − 38,499 1,614 32.31
≥ 38,500 2,241 44.87
sum 4,994 100.00
Table 3: Composition of the sample by company size
Approximately 45% of the companies can be classified as large corporations with average
sales of more than e 38.5 million. In addition, approximately 32% of companies are medium-
sized corporations with average sales between e 9.6 million and e 38.5 million, whereas
only approximately 23% are assigned to the “small corporations” group. Many companies in
the database are classified as small businesses with low disclosure requirements. Because
of missing data for these firms, we have to exclude these firms from the sample. Because
29 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2007), Statistisches Bundesamt (2009). In the absence of information on the
LBT , the average local business tax rate is used as an alternative.
30 In line with § 267 HGB (German Commercial Code) we classify companies by size using the arithmetic mean
of the sales from 2006 and 2008.
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the distribution in terms of totals assets across medium-sized and large companies in our
sample is very similar to the original sample, including datasets with missing variables, we
are confident that our sample is appropriate. Because mainly medium-sized and large corpo-
rations are expected to be affected by the interest barrier, we are not concerned about this
loss of data. Furthermore, the structure of companies in our sample proves to be very sim-
ilar to the one in the original sample in terms of profitability and leverage. For this reason,
the companies in and the size of our sample are regarded as appropriate for the subsequent
investigation.
Figure 2 depicts the development of the average LEV of our sample from 2005 to 2010. The
mean LEV decreases slightly over the entire period. Overall, a reduction of approximately
5.59 percentage points from 50.06% in 2005 to 44.47% in 2010 can be observed. On closer
examination, it can be observed that the mean LEV falls slightly faster after 2007 and is
nearly constant since 2009. Between 2007 and 2009, the mean LEV falls by 0.36% (2007),












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
mean LEV
Figure 2: Mean LEV of our sample
We expect that on average, those companies that are subject to the interest barrier reduce
their LEV more strongly than the unaffected companies. Because sufficiently high net interest
expense (NIE) is necessary to trigger the application of the interest barrier, the distribution
function of this variable is mapped in Figure 3. We see a strong concentration around zero
NIE, with a slight skew to the right. The average NIE is e 1,078.48, meaning that interest
expenses exceed interest income.
In contrast to a normally distributed variable, the skewness is not equal to zero, and the
arithmetic mean, median and mode are not identical. Here, a skewness of 50.01 indicates
that the majority of companies report NIE that is larger than the arithmetic mean. In 2006,
31 The LEV is adjusted against missing data only for 2006 and 2008. A more extensive cleanup of the LEV for
more years is not performed because this would limit the sample size further and produce no additional
information for the underlying setting.
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Figure 3: Distribution function with density line of the net interest expense (NIE in e 1,000) for the year
2006
most companies reported a net interest expense that was significantly higher than zero, often
even higher than e 1 million, i.e., those companies were likely to be subject to the interest
barrier.
5.2 Identification of the treatment group
The treatment group is determined as described in section 4.2. Table 4 displays the devel-
opment of the treatment group size after each step. Most companies in the sample (approx-
imately 90%) are not affected by the interest barrier because they do not have the required
net interest expenses. In addition, another approximately 80% of the remaining companies
are not subject to the interest barrier because of the exemption rules. They can either refer
to sufficient EBITDA or the stand-alone clause. One company can remain unaffected by the
interest barrier due to the equity clause.32 Due to tax group membership, 19 companies have
to be eliminated from the treatment group.33 Overall, 104 companies out of the total sample
met the interest barrier criteria in 2006. This corresponds to approximately 2.08%.
Using propensity score matching, as described in section 4.3, for each company of the treat-
ment group, a corresponding company can be determined for a caliper of less than 0.1. Thus,
32 It is important to note that only German parent companies can be considered for the equity comparison for
the equity clause. The sample includes 4,159 companies with a parent company, of which 1,923 companies
have a German and 2,236 an international parent company. Only for 914 companies (47.52% of German
parent companies) the necessary information for the equity comparison available. Due to this limitation in
the data, the escape clause might be underestimated in our analysis.
33 With a random sample, the proxy for the tax group membership relies on the entries of profit transfer agree-
ments in the commercial register (local court at the authors’ university). Spot-check inspections clarified that




in the full reduction remaining
clause sample per step companies
full sample 4,994 4,994
1. allowance 4,474 −4,474 520
2. EBITDA clause 4,834 −360 160
3. stand-alone clause 2,846 −36 124
4. escape clause 4,733 −1 123
5. tax group 4,582 −19 104
Table 4: Overview of the treatment group development for the year 2006
after the propensity score matching the treatment and control groups, each group includes
104 companies. Appendix F shows the coefficients of the propensity score estimation. The
variables TA, NI, NE, ROA, COLLATERAL and ZSCORE are significant at least at the 5%
level in the regression model. In addition, the underlying R2 is 23%.
5.3 Assessing matching quality
It is essential that the determined control group is sufficiently similar to the treatment group
in the chosen matching criteria. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) developed a standardized bias
to assess the similarity of the treatment and control groups for each observable (x) of each
company (Finke, 2014). The standardized bias (SB) is calculated as follows:




and is depicted in Table 5 for the unmatched and matched samples. The results illustrate that
propensity score matching leads to a strong reduction in the bias between the treatment and
control groups. On average, the reduction is almost between 36% and 92%, which indicates
a post-matching bias of less than 25% and in most cases less than 15%. Only the bias for
CURRENTRATIO could not be alleviated by the matching process. Moreover, a t-test for
equality is performed to examine the differences between the means of the treatment group
and the control group. The null hypothesis of the t-test that the treatment group’s mean is
not significantly different than that of the control group cannot be rejected for all variables,
except for the NE.34 Thus, only the significant difference at the 10% level of NE can be
observed between the two groups on the mean values.
In Figure 4, the standardized bias reduction is illustrated graphically by points before and
34 We also conducted a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test for equality because the Shapiro-Wilk
normality test shows that all variables are not normally distributed. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test confirms the results of the t-test with the exception of CURRENTRATIO. This indicates that the
group means for ZSCORE and CURRENTRATIO are not equal.
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variable mean treat mean control %bias %reduction |bias| t p>|t|
TA unmatched 11.862 9.6168 142.2 12.44 0.000
matched 11.862 12.077 − 13.6 90.4 −1.03 0.303
NI unmatched 16,752 5,757 13.3 1.71 0.087
matched 16,752 13,027 4.5 66.1 0.37 0.712
NE unmatched 5.1076 4.4387 40.0 4.35 0.000
matched 5.1076 5.5343 − 25.5 36.2 − 1.76 0.080
SALES unmatched 11.191 10.151 64.4 6.28 0.000
matched 11.191 11.490 − 18.5 71.3 − 1.19 0.236
ROA unmatched 0.0438 0.1186 − 52.6 − 5.64 0.000
matched 0.0438 0.0655 − 15.3 71.0 − 1.27 0.205
COLLATERAL unmatched 0.5865 0.3302 89.8 10.05 0.000
matched 0.5865 0.5472 13.8 84.7 0.95 0.342
NTR unmatched 40.278 40.063 11.1 1.10 0.270
matched 40.278 40.262 0.9 91.9 0.60 0.950
ZSCORE unmatched 1.7581 4.9892 − 4.9 − 0.35 0.723
matched 1.7581 1.2442 0.8 84.1 0.50 0.615
CURRENTRATIO unmatched 81.214 70.731 0.9 0.07 0.945
matched 81.214 138.55 − 4.7 − 447.0 − 0.37 0.715
∆LEV unmatched − 0.0069 − 0.0214 16.2 1.40 0.163
matched − 0.0069 0.0005 − 8.3 48.6 − 0.63 0.532
Notes: This table compares the means of all matching criteria of the treatment with those of the control group,
which was determined via propensity score matching. The first row for each criteria shows the mean of the
unmatched and the row below for the matched sample. The two columns in the middle display the bias between
the two subsamples and the reduction in the bias due to matching. The two columns on the right show the result
of a t-test if the mean values between the treatment and the control group are statistically equal. The results are
based on the nearest neighbor matching with a caliper of 0.1 for the year 2006.
Source: own calculation.
Table 5: Assessment of matching quality
crosses after matching. This figure demonstrates the strong standardized bias reduction by
the propensity score matching.
A further possibility to access the quality of the matching is interpreting the Pseudo − R2
from the probit estimation of the conditional treatment probability (propensity score) on
all matching variables before and after the matching. Table 6 illustrates that the matching
variables do not longer explain if a company is part of the treatment group. The explanatory
power in terms of the Pseudo− R2 is reduced by the propensity score matching from 0.217
to 0.025. The observables are also jointly insignificant (p > χ2 = 0.999). In the mean, the bias
between the unmatched and the matched sample across all matching criteria is reduced from
43.5% to 10.6%. All of these results suggest that the propensity score matching functions well
in assigning sufficiently similar control companies to the treatment companies.
Because of missing data, we can only validate the parallel trend of the dependent variable
∆LEV of the two groups prior to the reform for a subsample and the years 2005 and 2006.
The required data to calculate ∆LEV are available for 80 companies of the treatment and
82 companies of the control group. The results of a t-test for the mean values of ∆LEV

























Figure 4: Standardized % bias across covariates
Pseudo− R2 p > χ2 mean %bias median %bias
unmatched 0.217 0.000 43.5 28.1
matched 0.025 0.696 10.6 11.0
Notes: The table shows that after matching the matching criteria no longer provide
joint explanatory power for being affected by the interest barrier.
Source: own calculation.
Table 6: Joint insignificance of observables after matching
equal cannot be rejected. These results indicate that the requirement of a parallel trend for
the dependent variable in a DiD is fulfilled for the subsample. Overall, the results of this
t-test, the propensity score matching and the chosen research design strongly indicate that
the requirements for the DiD approach are fulfilled.
In Figure 5, the development of the mean of ∆LEV is depicted. ∆LEV of the treatment group
changes from -0.69% (2006) to -3.51% (2008) by a total of 2.82 percentage points. By contrast,
the mean ∆LEV of the control group is positive with 0.05% (2006) and 1.84% (2008).35 From a
purely descriptive perspective, this result highlights that the treatment group reacts system-
atically different than the control group. These descriptions already provide a first indication
that hypothesis H1 cannot be rejected.
The structure of the matched sample for the treatment and control groups is shown in Table
7. The expectation that more large companies are affected by the interest barrier cannot be
refuted descriptively because we find that approximately 65% large, 29% medium and only 6%
of small corporations are subject to the interest barrier. In addition, no huge differences in
size structure between the treatment and control groups can be observed.








treatment group control group
2006 2008
Figure 5: Mean ∆LEV of the treatment and control groups
sales matched treatment group control group
(in e1,000 ) count in % count in % count in %
< 9,680 15 7.21 6 5.76 9 8.65
9,681 − 38,499 47 22.59 30 28.84 17 16.34
≥ 38,500 146 70.19 68 65.38 78 75.00
sum 208 100.00 104 100.00 104 100.00
Table 7: Sample composition for the full, the matched sample and the treatment and control groups
6 Results
We estimate various regression models for equation (9) to test hypothesis H1. The results are
shown in Table 8 in columns (1) to (8). We focus on the interaction term TREAT · TIME to
determine the extent to which companies in the treatment group, i.e., those companies that
are subject to the interest barrier, adjust their leverage when they experience the tax reform
2008. In model (8), the variable TREAT ·TIME has a negative coefficient and is significant at
the 5% level. A negative coefficient implies that the companies that are affected by the interest
barrier reduce their LEV more strongly than those that are not affected. In other words, the
companies in the treatment group reduced their LEV by 4.7% percentage points more than
the companies in the control group. This indicates that hypothesis H1 for ∆LEV cannot be
rejected. However, we find considerably higher adjustments in leverage than previous studies
(Shih, 1996, also Blouin et al., 2014), which indicates that hitherto this effect has most likely
been underestimated.
The NTR is not significant at the 10% level but at the 15% level and has a negative coeffi-
cient.36 With the corporate tax reform of 2008, the corporate tax rate of 25% was reduced
to 15%. As a consequence, the benefit from the tax shield decreased. The sign of the coeffi-
cient is consistent with our expectation that companies use less debt because of the reduced
tax shield. For all other control variables, i.e., COLLATERAL, ROA and CURRENTRATIO,
we cannot draw any conclusions from our regression because the respective coefficients are
36 The coefficient NTR must be interpreted with care due to a correlation between NTR and TIME of -0.8663














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































not significant. The regression equation has an adjusted R2 of 0.065, which corresponds to
related studies.
Models (1) to (7) in Table 8 confirm the previously presented results of model (8). There are
no differences in the signs and only minimal changes in the magnitude of the coefficients,
except TIME. The coefficient TIME is unchanged in models (1) to (6). If we include NTR
in models (7) and (8), the sign of the coefficient of TIME changes, but is still insignificant.
However, the interaction term TREAT · TIME with -4.6% and -4.7% is nearly constant. We
find a significance level close to the 1% level with a p-value of 1.2%. This level is robust across
all models.
We estimate various regression models for equation (11) to test hypothesis H2. The results
are shown in Table 8 in columns (9) and (10). We find no significant impact of the dummy
variable LIQUIDITY and, moreover, LIQUIDITY has no impact on the interaction term
TREAT · TIME. Only the coefficient COLLATERAL is significant at the 10% level with a
slightly increased negative magnitude. Thus, we do not find evidence for a general influence
of the variable LIQUIDITY on ∆LEV . We display the results of the regression including
the three- way interaction in Table 8. The interaction term LIQUIDITY · TREAT · TIME
is not significant with a coefficient of 5.3%. A p-value of 0.2 indicates that companies with
liquidity constraints that are simultaneously affected by the interest barrier increase their
LEV by 5.3 percentage points. This result is consistent with our expectations. The coefficient
of TREAT ·TIME with -6.0% is significant at the 1% level, which is 1.3 percentage points larger
than in the initial investigation. All other coefficients remain almost unchanged. We believe
that the effect of the liquidity constraints dominates the response to the interest barrier.
We use the variance inflation factor (VIF) to test for multicollinearity. Basically, a smaller VIF
indicates less concern with respect to multicollinearity. If the VIF exceeds a certain critical
cut-off level, the results are no longer interpretable. A general cut-off value for VIF has not
been defined in the literature until now and depends on the underlying model. Sometimes,
the value ten is chosen (Wooldridge, 2014). The results of the VIF-test are displayed in Table
9. The complete model (8) includes VIFs smaller than ten. Except for NTR and TIME, all VIFs
are equal or smaller than three and are thus distant from ten. For this reason, we are not
concerned about multicollinearity.
7 Robustness checks
In the following, we report a battery of robustness checks. We test our results for the impact
of losses. Furthermore, we test for changes due to credit ratings, liquidity constraints, differ-
ent reporting dates, different matching approaches, a simplified calculation for the EBITDA













Table 9: Results of the VIF-test
So far, companies with losses are excluded to avoid biased results because of liquidity con-
straints. In this robustness check we test the influence of losses. All remains equal except
for the fact that companies with losses are not excluded from our sample. The results of the
calculation are shown in Appendix I. The treatment group has 181 companies, which is much
larger than in the initial investigation. The coefficient of TREAT ·TIME with 0.02 percentage
points is statistically not significant. Furthermore we include a dummy variable LOSSES,
which is 1 if the net income is smaller than zero. The coefficient of LOSSES with 5 percent-
age points is significant on the 1% level. We find evidence that losses have a positive influence
on ∆LEV , which highlights the robustness of our results based on the original sample selec-
tion excluding loss-making firms. Unreported calculations indicate that the matching quality
is weaker. We also calculated the regression without matching, including companies with
losses. The results are shown in the table in Appendix O. The coefficient of TREAT · TIME
with -3.2 percentage points is significant on the 5% level. This result is consistent with our
initial investigation. In addition, including the dummy variable LOSSES hardly changes the
results. Furthermore, unreported results for the initial calculation indicate that the results
remain unchanged if we exclude additional companies with losses in the year 2007. The
treatment group is then further reduced by eight companies.
The costs of and access to a loan often depend on the credit ratings by banks or rating
agencies, which are commonly used to control for credit risk. In general, credit ratings are
not published on a regular basis and are often only available for listed companies and thus
only for a small subsample of our dataset. To control for the influence of credit ratings, we
include the following two risk measures developed by Koch and Prassel (2011), which are




non current liabilities + loans
.





In their study, Koch and Prassel (2011) show that both of the accounting-based measures are
significantly negatively correlated with the credit rating variable, meaning that higher values
for these risk measures come with a weaker credit rating. We expect a negative influence
of the two risk measures on ∆LEV , meaning that a higher value of risk raises the cost of
debt and thus reduces the attractiveness of debt. It is not possible to conjecture a uniform
influence, either positive or negative. This effect depends on the initial level of the risk
measure before the reform and their development over time. Both directions are conceivable.
In Appendix L, the results of the additional estimation of the regression, including the two
risk measures RISK1 and RISK2, are shown. There, the columns (1) to (3) are based on
the full sample whereas columns (4) to (6) refer to a restricted sample where we excluded
values greater than one for RISK1. We consider these risk values as abnormal. The results
of TREAT · TIME are almost identical to our previous findings in both samples. In the full
sample, the significance is still at the 5% level and in the restricted sample, including RISK1
at the 1% level and including RISK2 at the 5% level. However, the p-value is just below the
1% level. The measures RISK1 and RISK2 are not significant in both samples and cannot
be interpreted. If we include these two risk measures in the regression model, the results
are only marginally affected. In sum, we find that our results for TREAT · TIME are robust
against these measures for credit ratings.
In the initial investigation, all reporting dates for the years 2006 and 2008 are included.
To test the results against different possible anticipation effects due to different reaction
periods, all financial statements with a reporting date that differs from December 31 are
excluded. In the table of Appendix M, it is obvious that the results are still robust. The
sample with 384 observations is smaller by 32 items. The interaction term TREAT · TIME
is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is -6.2%, 1.5 percentage points larger than in the
initial investigation.
The propensity score matching is very important in regard to identifying companies that
are similar to the treated companies. To test the robustness of the results, we calculate
the regressions using a propensity score matching with 1 to 5 neighbors with replacement
and without any propensity score matching. In Appendix N, we provide the results of the
regression for the treatment and control group after the propensity score matching with
1 to 5 neighbors and with replacement. Only the matching options are adapted; all other
assumptions remain unchanged. The treatment group still includes 104 companies and the
control group includes 417 companies, which results in 1,042 observations.37 The interaction
term TREAT · TIME is still significant at the 5% level, and with a value of -3.3%, is only
37 The difference to the expected 520 companies in the control group is because 1 to 5 neighbors matching is
only possible with replacement. See Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Companies that are included twice or more
in the control group are only taken into account once in the regression.
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1.4 percentage points smaller in comparison to the initial model. The regression results
without a matching are shown in Appendix O. The treatment group still consists of 104
companies and the control group 4,890 companies, which leads to 9,988 observations. The
results for the interaction term TREAT ·TIME remain unchanged at the 5% significance level
with a value of -3.3%. In sum, these two calculations indicate that the results are robust
against different matching approaches.
Assuming a placebo reform in 2006, we also examine whether potentially treated and un-
treated companies also differ in the development of their LEV in the period 2005 to 2006.38
The chosen new time window is much earlier than the German corporate tax reform in 2008
and can be regarded as a placebo reform in 2006. The results of this robustness test are
shown in Appendix P. As expected, the interaction term TREAT · TIME is neither statisti-
cally nor economically significant. This result implies that the investigated companies do not
differ in their behavior, and all companies react in the same way.39
The underlying definition of EBITDA in equation (13) contains a number of assumptions,
especially regarding the corporate tax. To test the robustness of the model against these
assumptions, we use the following simplified definition of EBITDA:
SIMP_EBITDA = profit+ net interest expenses+ depreciations. (17)
As a consequence, we obtain a slightly smaller treatment group with 97 companies. We repeat
our regression analysis for this simplified EBITDA. Our results are displayed in Appendix Q.
The interaction term TREAT · TIME is -3.8% and is significant at the 5% level. Using the
simplified EBITDA leads to results with a coefficient that is 1.1% smaller than in the initial
model. We believe that the calculation of the detailed EBITDA is more appropriate and that
the results of the simplified EBITDA lead to an underestimation of the effects due to this
inaccuracy. However, this test underlines the robustness of our previous calculations.
As discussed previously, we see no economic and empirical evidence suggesting that industry
matters to our research question. Nevertheless, we implement the industry as a matching
criterion to test the results against possible influences of different industries. In Table 10,
the distribution of the companies across different industries is shown and is classified by the
first digit of the US SIC code. It can be observed that the distribution for the ten different
industries is not equal. Industries 1, 2, 8 and 10 have at most 48 companies in the complete
sample and not more than one company in the treatment group. Consequently, a matching
38 We do not use the period 2004 to 2006 because the data for 2004 are not available in the necessary quality.
39 This result makes us confident that we do not need to be concerned about endogeneity. See Roberts and
Whited (2013) p. 529.
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with a caliper of 0.1 is not possible at a required quality level for these industries.40 Hence,
we do not consider this industry in the following. For all other industries, we are able to find
a matching company using the propensity score matching with the additional requirement of
the identical industry classification. All other assumptions remain unchanged. The results
total treatment
no. industry sample group
1. agriculture, forestry, fishing 42 1
2. mining 48 0
3. construction 620 24
4. manufacturing 1,863 29
5. transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services 869 22
6. wholesale trade 831 16
7. retail trade 202 2
8. finance, insurance and real estate 0 0
9. services 517 10
10. public administration 1 0
Notes: This table shows the regression result of the propensity score matching. Only data of the year
2006 are considered.
Source: own calculation.
Table 10: Distribution of the sample across industries (US SIC code)
are shown in Appendix R. The treatment group contains 93 companies. It is smaller than
the original treatment group because not all industries could be considered and a match
with a caliper of 0.1 could not be identified for all companies. The matching quality is lower
than in the initial investigation because the number of possible matches in each industry is
much smaller than in the complete sample. The coefficient in the table of Appendix R of the
interaction term TREAT · TIME is -3.0% and is statistically significant at the 10% level. This
indicates that the results are also stable if we consider industry as an additional matching
criterion.
To summarize, our robustness tests show that the results of the initial regression are very
stable. Furthermore, the effect of the interest barrier on the capital structure becomes
even stronger under certain conditions, which supports the impression that the response
to changes in interest deductibility have been underestimated in prior studies.
8 Conclusions
With a difference in difference approach, we investigate whether the introduction of an inter-
est deductibility restriction, as is being discussed in many countries, influences the financial
structure of companies. The theoretical literature suggests that taking the tax effects into
account debt should be preferred against equity and thus levered firms are expected to show
40 The industry 8 is not represented in the sample because all companies of this industry are excluded due to
special properties regarding their LEV.
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higher firm values. However, prior empirical research provides only mixed results on the
impact of taxes on corporate leverage and only moderate response to thin capitalizations
rules.
We use the introduction of the so- called interest barrier in Germany as a “quasi-experiment”
and employ an improved identification strategy to examine potential responses in corpo-
rate leverage empirically. The interest barrier prohibits, under certain conditions, the tax
deductibility of interest. Accordingly, it is expected that companies that are affected by the
interest barrier reduce their debt ratio.
We use the Dafne database by Bureau van Dijk with a sample size of 4,994 companies. Using
a propensity score matching with a significance level of 5%, we find that companies affected
by the interest barrier reduce their debt ratio by 4.7 percentage points more than companies
that are not affected. Furthermore, we find that affected companies without liquidity con-
straints reduce their debt ratio even more, i.e., by 6 percentage points. This result indicates
that the impact of thin capitalization rules on corporate leverage have most likely been under-
estimated thus far. In contrast to prior studies our results are also stable against a battery of
robustness checks and variations in the model specification, such as various risk measures,
different reporting dates, different matching approaches and a simplified EBITDA that serves
as an interest barrier threshold. Thus, our study provides unambiguous evidence for our
prediction that the introduction of an interest barrier uniformly lowers firms’ propensity to
use debt financing.
We are the first to employ a detailed matching approach to the underlying rich dataset, which
enables us to overcome several limitations of previous studies. We believe that our more
complete and well-specified model and identification strategy for the treatment and control
groups using a propensity score matching method avoids skewed results. In contrast to
previous studies, we obtain a very clear, unambiguous and stable result, meaning that our
results contribute strongly toward a better understanding of the effectiveness of interest
deductibility restrictions.
Our empirical results imply that the equity of those German companies that are affected by
the interest barrier has been strengthened. Thus, one political objective of the reform seems
to be achieved. However, the number of affected firms is rather limited due to several exemp-
tions in the German tax code. As a consequence the economic relevance of this tax reform
in Germany is rather small. However, if other countries that are currently discussing related
rules decide to introduce an interest barrier that is applicable to a broader group of firms, our
results can serve as a lower bound of the expected capital structure reactions. Furthermore,
if the OECD BEPS action plan succeeds in limiting undesired excessive cross-country debt fi-
nancing in multinational entities a newly introduced national interest barrier can be expected
to generate even more profound adjustments in corporate leverage. Nevertheless, from an
29
empirical perspective, the relationship between cross-country intrafirm debt financing and
the introduction of an interest barrier still needs to be scrutinized in future research.
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Figure 6: Expected response of the treatment group and the control group
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B List of data directly exported from the DAFNE database
Variable name Label
General information:
Name of the company NAME
BvD ID number BVD
National parent company - name NPC_NAME
National parent company - BvD ID number NPC_BVD
Global parent company - Name GPC_NAME
Global parent company - BvD ID number GPC_BVD
US SIC - Code USSIC
US SIC - description USSIC_NAME
Legal form LF
Type of financial statement ABA
Balance sheet date BSD
Interest of affiliated companies IFAC
Number of employees* NE
Number of subsidiaries NOS
Postcode PC
City C





Financial and investment income FIE






Liabilities with remaining maturity up to 1 year L1
Liabilities with remaining maturity between 1-5 years L15
Liabilities with remaining maturity more than 5 years L5
Liabilities to shareholders LTS
Provisions* P
Provisions for impending losses PFIL
Provisions for expenses PFE
Deferred taxes DT
Shares in affiliated companies SAC
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Variable name Label
Extraordinary items with an equity portion EIEP




Information from the income statement:









Income from investments IFI
Transfer of profits due to a profit or partial profit transfer agreement TGA
Transfer of losses due to a profit or partial profit transfer agreement TLA
Notes: * The data we use have significant missing values and obvious false entries, which may
lead to erroneous results of the investigation. For this purpose, all records are removed from
the sample that have no entries for the variables marked.
Table 11: Overview of the data exported from the Dafne database
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earnings stripping / interest deductibility rules
Figure 7: Map of various thin capitalization rules in selected countries
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D Systematization of thin capitalization rules
Notes: If debts exceed a certain debt ratio (harmful debt to equity ratio) interest deduction restrictions apply. The earnings threshold indicates that
the interest expenses are only tax-deductible up to a certain amount of earnings, e.g., EBITDA. If the harmful debt ratio or the earnings threshold are
exceeded, excess interest expenses are non tax-deductible (prohibition of deduction) or are reclassified as dividend payments (hidden profit distribution).
Source: Maßbaum (2011), p. 21.
Figure 8: Systematization of thin capitalization rules.
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1
E Classification of various thin capitalization rules
type short description countries
type 0 no regulations Croatia1, Cyprus, Estonia, India, Malta,
Netherlands, Slovakia
type 1 general regulations United Kingdom2, Ireland3, Luxembourg4, Austria5, Sweden
shareholder loans
type 2 debt ratio Belgium, Slovenia
hidden profit distribution
shareholder loans
type 3 debt ratio Denmark, Canada, France, Lithuania, Poland, USA
prohibition of deduction
shareholder loans
type 7 earnings threshold USA, France
prohibition of deduction
all loans
type 9 debt ratio Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic,
prohibition of deduction China, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Russia
all loans
type 11 asset threshold Denmark
prohibition of deduction
all loans
type 13 earnings threshold Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
prohibition of deduction Poland (from 2015), Spain
Notes: If debts exceed a certain debt ratio (harmful debt to equity ratio) interest deduction restric-
tions apply. The earnings threshold indicates that the interest expenses are only tax-deductible
up to a certain amount of earnings, e.g., EBITDA. If the harmful debt ratio or the earnings thresh-
old are exceeded, the excess interest expenses are non tax-deductible (prohibition of deduction)
or are reclassified as dividend payments (hidden profit distribution). 1Debt provided by foreign
shareholders with shares > 25% lead to non tax-deductible interest expenses if the debt exceeds
the shareholders’ equity by a factor of four. 2“Arms-Length-Principle.” 3Interest paid by a non-
trading company to a non-resident non-treaty parent company that owns at least 75% of the Irish
subsidiary is generally reclassified as a dividend (hidden profit distribution). 4In practice, the tax
administration applies a debt to equity ratio of 85:15 to the holding of participations. 5There are
no specific thin capitalization rules, but in accordance with case law, interest may be reclassified
as a dividend (hidden profit distribution) in certain situations. The tax authorities usually accept a
debt to equity ratio of 4:1 in tax audits, although this is not considered a safe harbor. Further de-
tailed information of characteristics of thin capitalization rules at year-end 2004 with an inventory
border for selected countries is available in Blouin et al. (2014), p. 34.
Source: Maßbaum (2011), p. 21 and Deloitte (2014).
Table 12: Classification of various thin capitalization rules in selected countries
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Notes: This table shows the regression re-
sults of the propensity score matching. Only
data from 2006 are considered.
Source: own calculations.
Table 13: Results of the propensity score matching
G Results of the t-test for the parallel trend assumption
mean std. err. t-test
treated control treated control diff t p>|t|
full ∆LEV 2005
sample ∆LEV 2006 −0.0069 −0.0005 0.0695 0.0993 −0.0064 −0.63 0.532
n 104 104
sub ∆LEV 2005 0.0057 −0.0059 0.0627 0.0734 0.0116 1.09 0.277
sample ∆LEV 2006 −0.0020 −0.0090 0.0742 0.0924 −0.0030 0.53 0.596
n 80 82














treatment group control group
2006 2008
Notes: This figure compares the development of the means of the LEV
of the treatment and the corresponding control group. Between 2006
and 2008, the important points in time in this investigation, the mean
LEV of the treatment group falls from 61.26% (2006) to 57.75% (2008),
by a total of 3.51 percentage points. During the same period, however,
the mean LEV of the control group rises from 37.94% (2006) to 39,78%,
a slight increase by 1.84 percentage points. As expected, the LEV of the
treatment group is a mean of 23.32 percentage points higher than the
LEV of the control group in 2006.
Figure 9: Mean LEV of the treatment and control groups
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I Robustness check, losses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME −0.024** −0.024** −0.024** −0.023** −0.024** −0.022* −0.050* −0.065** −0.066***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
TREAT −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.016 −0.015 −0.018 −0.015 −0.021* −0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
SALES 0.001 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
COLLATERAL 0.001 −0.029* −0.026
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
ROA −0.067* −0.048 −0.003
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
CURRENTRATIO 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ZSCORE −0.010*** −0.013*** −0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)




Constant 0.019** 0.002 0.019 0.023*** 0.019** 0.039*** 0.119 0.166* 0.147*
(0.008) (0.028) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.088) (0.090) (0.089)
Observations 724 724 724 724 724 724 724 724 724
adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.048 0.017 0.066 0.095
F statistic 3.802 2.946 2.848 3.547 3.006 9.104 3.173 5.636 7.519
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to the interest barrier. These companies have a net in-
terest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax group as subsidiaries and cannot use the EBITDA,
stand-alone or equity clause (1% limit). The control group consists of companies that are as similar as possible.
They were determined using propensity score matching and are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust stan-
dard errors on firm level are reported in parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the
1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2006 and 2008, own calculations.
Table 15: Results of the regression, robustness check losses
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J Robustness check, losses without matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.004 0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TREAT 0.023** 0.018** 0.017* 0.015* 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.007 −0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.034***−0.033***−0.033***−0.033***−0.034***−0.034***−0.034***−0.032** −0.031**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
SALES 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
COLLATERAL 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ROA −0.108*** −0.104*** −0.074***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
CURRENTRATIO 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ZSCORE −0.000** −0.000** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Constant −0.018***−0.060***−0.026***−0.007***−0.018***−0.018*** 0.005 −0.025 −0.035
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 12,034 12,034 12,034 12,034 12,034 12,034 12,034 12,034 12,034
adjusted R2 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.038
F statistic 7.672 15.95 13.64 59.66 5.938 7.125 6.019 33.36 47.79
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to the interest barrier. These companies have a net in-
terest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax group as subsidiaries and cannot use the EBITDA,
stand-alone or equity clause (1% limit). The control group consists of companies that are as similar as possible.
They were determined using propensity score matching and are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust stan-
dard errors on firm level are reported in parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the
1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2006 and 2008, own calculations.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































L Robustness check, credit ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
complete complete complete restricted restricted restricted
TIME −0.017 −0.016 −0.017 −0.019 −0.019 −0.019
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
TREAT −0.005 −0.009 −0.005 −0.009 −0.000 −0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.047** −0.045** −0.047** −0.047** −0.049*** −0.047**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
SALES 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
COLLATERAL −0.022 −0.024 −0.023 −0.020 −0.009 −0.022
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
ROA −0.002 −0.014 −0.003 −0.012 −0.010 −0.014
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
CURRENTRATIO 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001* −0.001 −0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ZSCORE −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NTR −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004





Constant 0.118 0.110 0.121 0.129 0.144 0.132
(0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103)
observations 416 416 416 404 404 404
F statistic 0.056 0.058 0.056 0.063 0.067 0.064
adjusted R2 2.683 2.501 2.421 2.962 2.837 2.672
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to the interest barrier. These
companies have a net interest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax
group as subsidiaries and cannot use the EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause (1% limit). The
control group consists of companies that are as similar as possible. They, were determined
using propensity score matching and are not subject to the interest barrier. The regression
results are tested for robustness against the risk measures RISK1 and RIKS2. The Columns
(1) to (3) are based on the full sample while the columns (4) to (6) are based on a restricted
sample with excluded values greater than one for RISK1 as abnormal values (Koch and
Prassel (2011), p. 12.). Robust standard errors on firm level are reported in parentheses.
The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2006 and 2008, own calculations.
Table 18: Results of the regression, robustness check for RISK1 and RISK2
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M Robustness check, various reporting dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.018 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.029)
TREAT 0.022 0.026* 0.022 0.022* 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.024*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.064***−0.064***−0.064***−0.065***−0.062***−0.065***−0.064*** −0.062***













Constant −0.029***−0.102***−0.036***−0.032***−0.029***−0.015 0.055 −0.028
(0.009) (0.034) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.102) (0.102)
observations 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384
adjusted R2 0.035 0.047 0.036 0.038 0.044 0.057 0.037 0.113
F statistic 4.588 4.718 3.546 3.764 4.403 5.679 3.610 5.279
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to the interest barrier. These companies
have a net interest expense greater than e 3 million, do not belong to a tax group as subsidiaries
and cannot use the EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause (2% limit). The control group consists of
companies that are as similar as possible. They were determined using propensity score matching
and are not subject to the interest barrier. The regression results are tested for robustness against
the liquidity measure LIQUIDITY . The measure LIQUIDITY is a dummy variable with the value
1 if CURRENTRATIO < 1 . Robust standard errors on firm level are reported in parentheses. The
asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2006 and 2008, own calculations.
Table 19: Results of the regression, robustness check for various reporting dates
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N Robustness check, 1 to 5 nearest neighbor matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 −0.025 −0.039**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019)
TREAT −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.006 −0.004 −0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.031* −0.031* −0.031* −0.031* −0.031* −0.033** −0.031* −0.033**













Constant −0.003 −0.045** 0.000 −0.001 −0.003 0.007 0.103 0.125*
(0.005) (0.021) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.065) (0.067)
observations 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042 1,042
adjusted R2 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.028 0.012 0.043
F statistic 3.341 3.641 2.562 2.778 2.506 7.593 3.171 5.131
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to the interest barrier. These companies
have a net interest expense greater than e 3 million, do not belong to a tax group as subsidiaries
and cannot use the EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause (2% limit). The control group consists of
companies that are as similar as possible, which were determined using a propensity score matching
(1 to 5 nearest neighbor) and are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust standard errors on firm
level are reported in parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% /
10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2006 and 2008, own calculations.
Table 20: Results of the regression, robustness check for propensity score matching with 1 to 5 nearest
neighbors
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O Robustness check, without matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** −0.001 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
TREAT 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.034** −0.033** −0.034** −0.034** −0.034** −0.034** −0.034** −0.033**













Constant −0.021***−0.075***−0.028***−0.012***−0.021***−0.021*** 0.006 −0.035
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.025)
observations 9,988 9,988 9,988 9,988 9,988 9,988 9,988 9,988
adjusted R2 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.016
F statistic 3.047 16.36 6.801 23.63 2.293 3.395 2.607 17.67
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to the interest barrier. These companies
have a net interest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax group as subsidiaries
and cannot use the EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause. The control group consists of all other
companies in the sample which are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust standard errors on firm
level are reported in parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% /
10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2006 and 2008, own calculations.
Table 21: Results of the regression, robustness check without matching
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P Robustness check, falsification test placebo reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
TREAT 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009













Constant −0.011 −0.047* −0.011 −0.010 −0.011 −0.008 −0.050 −0.043
(0.008) (0.026) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.091) (0.093)
observations 436 436 436 436 436 436 436 436
adjusted R2 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.015
F statistic 0.190 0.679 0.142 0.488 0.155 0.228 0.188 0.745
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to a potential interest barrier in 2005.
These companies have a net interest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax group as
subsidiaries and cannot use the EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause. The control group consists of
companies that are as similar as possible, which were determined using a propensity score matching
and are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust standard errors on firm level are reported in
parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2005 and 2006, own calculations.
Table 22: Results of the regression, robustness check placebo reform 2006
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Q Robustness check, simplified EBITDA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008 −0.041 −0.041
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.028)
TREAT 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.036** −0.036** −0.036** −0.036** −0.037** −0.038** −0.036** −0.038**













Constant −0.005 0.007 −0.017 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 0.119 0.100
(0.009) (0.028) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.094) (0.098)
observations 388 388 388 388 388 388 388 388
adjusted R2 0.045 0.045 0.050 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.049 0.058
F statistic 6.028 4.563 5.073 4.528 4.656 4.869 4.969 2.606
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to a potential interest barrier in 2005.
These companies have a net interest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax group
as subsidiaries and cannot use the simplified EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause. The control group
consists of companies that are as similar as possible, which were determined using a propensity score
matching and are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust standard errors on firm level are reported
in parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2005 and 2006, own calculations.
Table 23: Results of the regression, robustness check simplified EBITDA
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R Robustness check, various industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV ∆LEV
TIME 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 −0.035 −0.051**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.025)
TREAT 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
TREAT · TIME (−) −0.031* −0.031* −0.031* −0.031* −0.029* −0.033* −0.031* −0.030*













Constant −0.011 −0.079** −0.017 −0.010 −0.011 −0.003 0.135 0.074
(0.009) (0.031) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.087) (0.087)
observations 372 372 372 372 372 372 372 372
adjusted R2 0.019 0.033 0.020 0.021 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.102
F statistic 2.372 3.103 1.877 1.996 3.138 3.557 2.507 4.588
Notes: The treatment group consists of companies subject to a potential interest barrier in 2005.
These companies have a net interest expense greater than e 1 million, do not belong to a tax group
as subsidiaries and cannot use the simplified EBITDA, stand-alone or equity clause. The control group
consists of companies that are as similar as possible, which were determined using a propensity score
matching and are not subject to the interest barrier. Robust standard errors on firm level are reported
in parentheses. The asterisks (*** / ** / *) indicate the significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
Source: Dafne database, 2005 and 2006, own calculations.
Table 24: Results of the regression, robustness check of various industries
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